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A REFERENCE MODEL FOR PROCESS-ORIENTED 
IT RISK MANAGEMENT 
Sackmann, Stefan, University of Freiburg, Institute of Computer Science and Social Studies, 
Telematics, Friedrichstr. 50, 79098 Freiburg, Germany, sackmann@iig.uni-freiburg.de
Abstract
The economic relevance of IT risks is increasing due to various operational, technical as well as 
regulatory reasons. Increasing flexibility of business processes and increasing dependability on IT 
require continuous risk assessment, challenging current methods for risk management. Extending IT
risk management by a business process-oriented view is a promising approach for taking the 
occurring dynamics and interlinks into consideration. In this contribution, a systematic modeling of 
relations between causes (threats) and effects (direct and indirect loss) is pursued, bringing together 
the economic, process-oriented view with the technical, threat-oriented view of IT risks. It is discussed 
how the integration of cause and effect relations into the risk management process can improve the 
data basis for continuous risk assessment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Current market trends urge many companies to flexibly design their business processes in order to 
react to customers’ changing demands. Some authors certainly regard the flexibility of business 
processes as an important instrument for companies to be able to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors (e.g. Sanchez 1995, Mills 2007). To create flexibility, information technology assumes an 
increasingly supportive role. Empirical findings show that, at least in Germany, two out of three 
companies already use IT systems such as ERP or SCM to model and manage their business processes 
(Sackmann and Strüker 2005). In addition, the increasing operational use of web services and the 
realization of service-oriented architectures as well as the use of virtualization approaches or so-called 
services on demand provide a helpful and suitable technological infrastructure for realizing flexible 
business processes (Mills 2007, Krafzig et al. 2005).
Increasing flexibility of business processes relying on IT not only improves workflow performance but 
also places particular emphasis on IT risks. Business processes are directly linked with a company’s 
economic return as well as regulatory and standard compliance. Thus, increasing dependency of 
business processes on IT also increases the possible indirect losses resulting from a malfunction of IT
that can easily exceed the direct ones. Furthermore, increasing flexibility of business processes and 
their IT support makes it almost impossible to define all possible workflows in advance. This means 
increasing challenges for current IT risk management methods because they usually assume stable 
relations between causes and effects. Providing business process management with accurate risk 
information at any time requires risk assessment taking fast-changing specifications of an interlinked 
IT into consideration. However, IT is not only the source of new risks but also a promising starting 
point for assessing and managing them.
This paper presents a business process-oriented approach for modeling relations between threats on IT 
(causes) and their effects on business processes on the basis of a layer model. The integration of the 
model into the risk management process and the possible outcome for improving IT risk management 
is discussed. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The second section takes the increas-
ing relevance of IT risks resulting from flexible business processes and their realization with IT as its 
theme. The IT Risk Reference Model is presented in the third section. Its suitability to modeling 
relations between causes of IT risks and their effects on a company’s results is discussed in the fourth 
section. Finally, in the fifth section, the integration of cause-effect relations into the typical risk 
management process and necessary extensions are discussed in order to making a validation of the 
model feasible. Furthermore, open research issues in the field of business process-oriented IT risk 
management are identified. The contribution closes with a short conclusion and outlook.
2 BUSINESS PROCESS-ORIENTED IT RISK MANAGEMENT
There is no common interpretation of IT risks in associated literature. While some authors (e.g. BSI
2005, Muehlen and Rosemann 2005) define IT risks as the probability of damage excluding the 
amount of loss, other authors (e.g. Parker 2007) concentrate exclusively on the so-called “long tail” 
risks that occur with low frequency and high impact. From a value-oriented view (Rappaport 1998), IT
risks should be seen as part of operational risks measuring the unexpected losses that are determined 
by the frequency and amount of losses e.g. by their value at risk (Basel 2001). Such a loss-oriented 
view is taken up in this contribution.
Analyzing the trends of current developments unquestionably leads to an increasing economic 
significance of IT risks. IT has a dual role in companies: Firstly, IT is becoming increasingly
important for an efficient production of goods and services as well as for the efficient coordination of 
business activities in a mounting interlinked economy. Secondly, the importance of IT as tool for 
managing companies is also increasing. In both fields, a disturbance of IT, e.g. unavailability or non-
integrity, can cause persistent business failure within a short time. Furthermore, an increasing regional, 
national, international, and sector-specific regulation (e.g. HIPPA, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Basel II), 
(quasi-)standards (e.g. CoBIT, ITIL), and contractual agreements (e.g. outsourcing, service level 
agreement) raise IT risk for companies and make explicit demands on IT risk management (Tarantino 
2006). Last but not least, an increasing number of known vulnerabilities (Whitman 2003, Gordon et al. 
2006) as well as maturing attacks (e.g. phishing, pharming) and limited capabilities of security 
mechanisms to enforce information flow or liveness properties (Schneider et al. 2001) is continuously 
threatening interlinked information systems. Bringing all these trends together, management of IT
risks resulting from the operational use of IT is more than a current hype. The increasing relevance of
IT risks also means an increasing need to manage them.
“Traditional” methods for risk management are challenged by the increasing flexibility of business 
processes and their support by IT in several ways: Firstly, fast-developing IT makes it difficult to rely 
on qualified experiences in estimating the implications of changes for IT risk and thus their adequate 
treatment in risk quantification. Secondly, the relationship between the causes of IT risks and their 
effects is – at least in modern companies – very complex and heavily interdependent. Each threat can 
endanger several business processes since many IT applications are not usually used exclusively for 
one business process. Conversely, each business process can be endangered by several threats since 
business processes are usually supported by several IT applications. Thirdly, the increasing flexible 
use of IT constantly changes the tangled relationship between the causes of IT risks and their possible 
effects on business processes. The motives are manifold, for instance the automated patching of 
software bugs and vulnerabilities, the adaptation of workflows in real time to business needs, the 
flexible (re-)combination of services e.g. in service-oriented architectures or the execution of identical 
IT applications on different platforms in order to optimize capacity utilization (virtualization). These 
specific characteristics of IT make IT risks a moving target and are inherently opposing “traditional” 
methods that are suitable for quantifying isolated risks periodically assuming a stable relationship 
between their causes and effects. 
Best of all, available methods for managing risks can be applied for IT as assets in themselves (e.g. 
hardware), in their role as protector of other assets (e.g. customer data, research and development 
results) or in their role as compliance observer (e.g. segregation of duty). In the best case, the calcu-
lation of the frequency of loss is based on a history recorded over several periods and the amount of 
losses can be derived from an analysis of the cases collected. However, any change of the relationship 
between cause and effects makes such historic data increasingly inaccurate and, strictly spoken,
requires a revaluation of the historical data basis according to the changes and, consequently, a new 
quantification of the risks under consideration. Currently, such modifications are made indirectly by 
an “expert”-based, manual overall adjustment of either the distributions of loss events or the distribu-
tion of loss amounts. For instance, when implementing a virus scanner for the first time, it is assumed 
it will reduce the risk of virus attacks by, e.g., 95 %. According to the concept of security levels 
introduced by (Faisst and Prokein 2005), the distribution of loss events should then be accordingly 
modified, while the distribution of loss amounts remains unchanged, resulting in a new distribution of 
risk. In a similar manner, the quantification of IT risks is actualized when, e.g., large organizational 
changes are carried out or substantial IT projects are realized.
However, applying such an “event-driven” overall adjustment of IT risks uncritically to IT risks, with-
out adapting to the context of flexible business processes and their support by IT is expected to lead to 
a misjudgment of a company’s “real” IT risks. Neither underestimation nor overestimation is optimal 
from a value-oriented stakeholder’s perspective. Therefore, a process-oriented IT risk management is 
required, being capable to take also partly, only marginally changing relations between causes and 
effects on the company’s results into consideration. This requires the integration of a technical as well 
as an economic view, since events like moving an IT application from one server to another one can 
increase (or decrease) the probability of damage enormously without changing the functionality of the 
IT application from a business process view. Also, the integration of an existing IT application into a 
critical business process can increase the possible loss in the case of damage enormously without 
changing the IT from a technical point of view. 
The management of risks occurring from IT in its role as flexible and continuously changing infra-
structure supporting business processes requires an extension of “traditional” risk management that 
enables continuously changing cause-effect relations to be taken into consideration. For this purpose, 
the layer-based IT Risk Reference Model is proposed providing a formal approach for modeling IT 
risks in a structured way on the basis of their relation between cause and effect. 
3 IT RISK REFERENCE MODEL
Modeling the relations between the causes of IT risks and their effects on business processes can 
rapidly become a very complex task. Finding a suitable abstraction from reality and maintaining ex-
planation content is an issue of each modeling approach. To reduce complexity, the IT Risk Reference 
Model has been developed. It is structured following a hierarchical abstraction layer model as used in 
computer science for reducing complexity e.g. in network communication (Tanenbaum 1979). The 
single layers are defined in a manner that they encapsulate similar functionalities on a general level 
while concealing the details that have to be customized to each single use. The connection between the 
layers is given by so-called “services” that are offered from a lower to a higher layer, keeping all 
subordinated layers transparent. 
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Figure 1. IT Risk Reference Model
A layer model for modeling IT risks requires a linking of the causes, i.e. the threats from a mainly 
technological view and the effects, i.e. the parts of a business process that is disturbed. As a first and 
simple approach, the IT Risk Reference Model is proposed with four different layers as depicted in 
Figure 1. Beginning with the economic view on IT risks, the fourth layer (top) represents the “effects” 
and contains all activities of the business process or workflow that is regarded as an asset from a risk 
perspective. The third layer contains all IT applications and their underlying IT infrastructure repre-
senting resources to the superordinated process activities. The “bridge” between the economic and the 
more technical layers constitutes vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities constitute the possible points of attack 
for threats that violate protection goals of the superordinated IT applications (Schneier 1999). Thus, 
the second represents the vulnerabilities of the superordinated IT applications and IT infrastructure, 
while the set of all (known) threats is part of the first layer (bottom) representing the “causes”. 
Layer 4: Business Process (BP)
Business processes combine several sub-processes and activities (workflows) into a single process,
usually cutting across traditional departmental or functional boundaries of a company (Harmon 2003). 
Directed toward a quantification of IT risks, each business process is to be defined in such a way that 
its monetary contribution to the company’s result can be calculated, e.g., from controlling or cost 
accounting. In general, business processes can be modeled independently from the underlying 
information system, for instance with ARIS modeling tools, on the basis of UML, or in the form of 
simple sequence diagrams (Scheer 2000, Giaglis 2001, Palm 2003). The implementation of activities 
and associated procedures can be described by a definition set of workflows (Ellis 1999) and flexibly 
adapted to the context by varying the sequence of activities. On the BP layer, those parts of the 
business process should be regarded as independent components that are defined as enclosed activities 
using at least one IT application for their realization. 
Layer 3: IT Application / IT Infrastructure (AP)
The AP layer includes all IT applications as well as their underlying IT infrastructure that are used 
from the defined components of the BP layer and are thus supporting the business process. The 
differentiation of enclosed IT applications as components of the AP layer is strongly dependent on the 
individual company and, for instance, influenced by its historical development of IT use and existing 
information systems. To give general recommendations for action is difficult and not focused on in 
this contribution. A simplification of this task can be expected for companies following a service-
oriented architecture approach. Realizing procedures of business process as services makes the 
identification of enclosed IT applications easy because the web services implemented are inherently 
defined as independent applications that encapsulate functions (Curbera et al. 2003, Krafzig et al. 
2005). In this case, the identification of relevant enclosed IT applications as well as their relation to 
the superordinated activities of the BP can then be automatically carried out to a very large degree by 
analyzing the formal “orchestration” information, e.g. the BPEL1 description of the business process. 
IT applications are at the same time relevant points of failure. Malfunction of IT applications have 
(undesirable) effects on the business process and thus the IT applications defined should meet specific 
goals of the superordinated business process. Such goals can be defined as protection goals as they are 
known in IT security research, such as availability, integrity, dependability, or confidentiality (Müller 
et al. 1999). The assignment of protection goals to IT applications allows the bringing together of the 
economic handling of IT risks with the more technological, IT security-based handling of IT risks on 
the basis of vulnerabilities. Consequently, vulnerabilities are the core of the next layer. 
Layer 2: Vulnerabilities (VN)
The VN layer includes all vulnerabilities that exist in the components of the AP layer. Vulnerabilities 
are seen as a “bridge” between business processes and IT threats because they are both the target of 
attacks and the cause of disturbance of business processes. Identification of vulnerabilities can be 
achieved by applying collection methods, creativity methods or analytical search methods (Veseley et 
al. 1981, Bishop 2004). While the first and second usually lead to incomplete results, analytical search 
1 The Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) is an XML-based language for defining business processes and their 
implementation with web services. For more detailed information see, e.g., http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsbpel/2.0/OS/
wsbpel-v2.0-OS.html.
methods systematically reveal vulnerabilities. Bottom-up directed analytical methods like the Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or the Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) analyze 
individual threats and their effects (Kletz 1992), whereas the top-down directed methods like attack 
trees are suitable for covering dependencies between the individual threats (Schneier 1999). In 
general, top-down directed methods are more lavish and, because they describe all known attack trails 
for the “disturbed” component in mind, they produce more extensive results. Encapsulating 
vulnerabilities in one separated layer might seem a bit “artificial”. However, they are an essential part 
of the chain of cause and effects connecting threats with business processes and since vulnerabilities 
can be found not only in applications but also in middleware, operating systems or hardware, they are 
possibly relevant for more than one IT application identified on the AP layer. Thus, In the VN layer, 
the vulnerabilities identified are interpreted as independent “components” that can be associated to at 
least one IT application. 
Layer 1: Threats (TH)
The basic TH layer includes all known threats that are seen as causes of IT risks and, ideally, can be 
described with a probability of their occurrence. Threats always exist regardless of whether they are 
realized as attacks or not. A starting point for defining and categorizing relevant threats can be found 
in historic events or best-practice frameworks (Howard and Longstaff 1998). A detailed list can be 
found, for example, in the threat catalogues of the IT-Grundschutz Manual (BSI 2005) which lists 
around 370 threats in the categories of Force Majeure, Organizational Shortcomings, Human Failure, 
Technical Failure and Deliberate Acts. In the TH layer, the components are such threats that are able 
to exploit vulnerabilities of the VN layer and are the cause of successful attacks.
Within these four layers, the relations between the causes and effects can be modeled addressing the 
needs of process-oriented IT risk management. Of course, the four layers are only a “minimal” 
division that possibly has to be expanded when applying the reference model. Expanding the IT risk 
reference model may facilitate a better and more detailed view of the depicted relations between 
causes and effects. However, on a general level, it does not change the aspired integration of cause-
effect relations into the IT risk management process, as discussed in the following section. 
4 MODELING CAUSE & EFFECT RELATIONS FOR IT RISKS
The proposed IT Risk Reference Model can serve as foundation for a formal modeling of the relations 
between causes of IT risks and their effects on the business processes or a company’s returns. There 
are several ways to describe these relations. As first approach, a formal modeling by simple matrixes 
is proposed. In general, a company with a identified components on the A layer and b identified 
components on the B layer (with A, B ∈ {BP, AP, VN, TH}) can describe the relations between both 
























The different layers of IT Risk Reference Model and the relations between these layers can then be 
























c = number of components in BP layer














































with f = number of components in TH layer
The matrix representation serves as a framework for a formal description of searched cause-effect 
relations for IT risks. Furthermore, applying the IT Risk Reference Model to a company’s business 
processes and IT support requires an additional concept to define how the relations li,j, mi,j, and ni,j
between the identified components are formally modeled. Certainly one of the simplest approaches is 
to model the relations in a binary manner and to define, e.g., the relation li,j between the business 
process activity BPi and the IT application APj as 
(3) li,j ∈ {0,1} ∀ i∈{1, …, c} ∧ j∈{1, …, d} 
where “0” means “there is no relation, the business process activity BPi does not rely on the IT 
application APj” and “1” means “there is a relation, the business process activity BPi does rely on the 
IT application APj”. The relations between the other layers can be modeled respectively. 
While the single relations between the BP and AP layer represent the technical support of the business 
process by IT applications, the relations between the AP, VN and TH layers are characterized by a 
company’s security management in place. Technical as well as organizational security measures can 
be interpreted as “interruptions” of corresponding relations. For example, new added internal security 
mechanisms of IT applications or patching vulnerabilities could be modeled by putting value of the 
corresponding relation between the layers of IT application and vulnerabilities to “0”. In the 
unrealistic case of secure IT applications running on a secure operating system as well as secure 
hardware, there would be no link between the layers and, thus, no IT risk threatening the outcome of 
the business process. 
Remaining vulnerabilities can be addressed by security mechanisms opposing threats and successfully 
averting attacks. Since security mechanisms are not always capable of closing single vulnerabilities 
completely, it is important to take their effectiveness into consideration when modeling the relations 
between causes and effects of IT risks. For determining the effectiveness and power of security 
mechanisms, computer scientists suggest using methods of verification (e.g. Basin et al. 2003) or, if no 
formal description of the state space ex ante is possible, criteria as, e.g., defined in the Common 
Criteria (ISO/IEC 2005). Economic concepts usually quantify the efficiency of security mechanisms in 
the form of the general probability that an attack can be averted (e.g. Gordon and Loeb 2002) or in the 
form of security levels (Faisst and Prokein 2005) in order to decide on optimal levels of IT security or 
the favorability of concrete investments in security mechanisms. 
Describing the relations with binary variables as proposed in this contribution is a deliberate 
simplification in order to achieve a first “proof of concept” of modeling cause-effect relations and 
integrating them into IT risk management. Of course, the relations between the layers can be modeled 
in a more precise manner, for example in the form of probabilities, probability distributions or even 
conditional probabilities setting up a Bayesian network. However, determining such probabilities is a 
challenging issue. Likewise, as a major advantage of layered models, each single layer can be 
extended and be modeled in a more detailed manner. For further research, particularly the AP layer 
should be subject to extension: since vulnerabilities can be found in applications as well as in 
middleware, operating systems or hardware, it may become necessary for practical reasons to 
subdivide the AP layer into more detailed sub-layers as, e.g., proposed by (Tanenbaum 1979). In the 
end, the operational trade-off between exactitude and the effort to get the necessary data will have to 
provide reasons for which kind of formal description of the relations can optimally come into place.
5 EXTENDING RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Process-oriented management of IT risks and the provision of “real-time” information about them 
requires taking alterations of the cause-effect relations into consideration. The IT Risk Reference 
Model developed in this contribution had been designed as a first step to achieve this goal, however, 
its evaluation and validation requires several extensions of the “traditional” risk management process.
These extensions as well as subjects of further research are discussed in the following along a typical 
risk management process (e.g., Boehm 1989) containing the phases of identification, quantification, 
treatment, and control. 
Extensions of the risk identification:
The starting point of any risk management is the identification of relevant threats that are possibly the 
cause of negative effects on a company’s results. As described in the context of the first layer of the IT
Risk Reference Model, there are extensive lists (e.g. IT Grundschutz Manual) that provide an 
elaborated basis for categorization of IT risks. However, such best practice lists enumerate known 
isolated threats (causes) but give no hint on how to take the cause-effect relations or possible 
interdependencies between the risks into consideration. Thus, it is proposed to use the IT Risk 
Reference Model as extended starting point for the definition of relevant threats and to categorize 
these according to the formally described “pathways” from the threats to the business process 
activities. An IT risk, simply named until now, e.g., as “virus attack” would then, e.g., be named as 
“virus attack exploiting vulnerability x disturbing IT application y supporting business process activity 
z”. Of course, at least theoretically, this extension enlarges the “space” of possible IT risk categories 
enormously. However, in practice, since the present categories can still be preserved and used, it 
means a more detailed and formal assignment (Baker et al. 2007) as well as the basis for a process-
oriented evaluation of IT risks.
Extensions of the phase of risk quantification:
Risks are usually quantified on the basis of occurred events of loss in a periodical manner. While 
several methods for quantification exist (McNeil et al. 2005), for reasons of comparability with other 
risks (e.g. financial risks), the value-at-risk is proposed as a standardized measure (e.g., Holton 2003, 
Jaisingh et al. 2001). For calculating the value-at-risk of operational risks, methods like the Internal 
Measurement Approach, Monte-Carlo-Simulations, Extreme Value Theory, or Bayes Belief Networks 
are usually applied (Basel 2001, Cruz 2002). As long as IT risks satisfy the assumption of a positively 
skewed distribution, adequate methods for calculating the IT risk are available. These methods do not 
require an extension. 
A more promising approach for considering cause-effect relations in risk quantification can be reached 
by extending the underlying data basis. Independent of the concrete quantification method in use, the 
data basis includes historical experiences, in the best case a complete, methodical collection of all 
cases of loss incurred in several earlier periods. These cases serve as a basis for deriving a distribution 
of the amount of loss and a distribution of its likelihood. Based on these distributions, the expected 
and unexpected losses for the next period are calculated. Adapting this calculation to new 
circumstances or developments, e.g. alterations in IT infrastructure, organizational changes in the 
company, or changed attacker behavior, is usually carried out by adapting the distributions on an 
overall level. For instance, the implementation of a new virus scanner that is expected to reduce the 
likelihood of virus attacks by 95 % can be correspondingly transferred to the distribution of likelihood. 
The assessment of the extent of such overall adaptations usually requires specific expert knowledge 
because the detailed cause-effect relations are hidden in a black box. For opening this black box an 
adaptation of the individual cases of loss within the data basis seems to be a more promising way, 
resulting in a more realistic adaptation of the distributions than the practiced overall one. A first 
indicator approach for measuring alterations of cause-effect relations with binary matrixes can be 
found in (Sackmann 2008).
Therefore, the extension of the risk quantification phase focuses less on the quantification methods of 
the risk and more on the integration of the cause-effect relations into the assessment of individual 
cases of loss and, thus, on the improvement of the data basis. For building up a data basis taking the 
cause-effect relations into consideration, an extension of current data schemes is required. In addition 
to date, time, category of risk and absolute amount of loss, it is necessary to also record the current 
cause-effect relations when a case of loss has occurred. As discussed for the identification phase, the 
IT Risk Reference model is proposed as a suitable extension for data modeling. In the course of time, 
extended data can be accumulated, building a new and rich data basis for risk quantification. Knowing 
the relations between causes and effects for each case of loss allows the data basis to be adapted to 
new situations with (possibly only marginal) changes in the cause-effect relations. Although methods 
for such an adaptation are still subject to research, it can be expected to get a more realistic assessment 
of the actual IT risk situation than with overall adaptations of distribution curves.
Extensions of the phase of risk treatment:
An improved and more accurate data basis also gives reasons for finding better (or optimal) decisions 
about measures for avoidance, mitigation, transfer, and/or diversification of existing risks. Several 
methods and models are proposed to calculate the favorability of different investments, e.g. (Finne 
1998, Gordon and Loeb 2002, Cavusoglu 2004, Faisst and Prokein 2005). All these methods have in 
common that they decide about the favorability of a measure on the basis of comparing the costs with 
the “returns” in the form of risk reduction. With an extended data basis at hand, it is expected that the 
assessment of the risk reduction can be calculated with more accuracy when taking the implications of 
the measures on the cause-effect relations into consideration. 
Extensions of the phase of risk control:
The operative phase of risk control (or monitoring) aims at a continuous actual versus target 
comparison and, if necessary, to induce the actualization of the other phases. Strictly speaking, in the 
phase of risk control, every change in the cause-effect relation is due to be evaluated according to the 
implications for the risk status of the business process. This requires a detection of changes within the 
cause-effect relations. In the context of flexible business processes and continuous (automated) 
changes in their IT support, this detection also requires automation, at least on those layers where 
changes occur with high frequency. The necessary extensions of the phase of risk control are thus 
methods for detecting and measuring differences in cause-effect relations within and between all 
layers of the IT Risk Reference Model. For an automated detection of cases of losses and for the 
continuous assessment of the implications of changes in IT risk, current business process models have 
to be extended with control models. There are no current suitable solutions for the first or the latter 
and both issues are the subject of further research.
It is obvious that the evaluation and validation of the contribution of the IT Risk Reference Model to 
the quality of IT risk management as “standing alone” extension is neither suitable nor feasible. This
requires rather its integration into all phases of an IT risk management process, which is an extensive 
venture requiring new methods and, most notably, time to build up an adequate database. With this at 
hand, an empirical comparison of current methods for risk management becomes feasible, not only 
regarding the exactitude of the results but also regarding the effort necessary to obtain the required 
data and to implement the necessary extensions.
6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The advancing realization of business processes with the support of IT means both efficiency progress 
and increased IT risks. Current economical as well as technological developments push ahead the 
flexibility of business processes and dynamics of the IT infrastructure. The resultant continuously
changing relations between causes and effects also continuously change the IT risks. Providing 
management at any time with accurate information about the IT risk of a business process requires 
automation and extending “traditional” risk management approaches by taking the cause-effect 
relations into consideration. As a first step, the relations between the threats to IT (causes) and their 
implications on the business process activities (effects) have to be modeled in a standardized and 
formal way. The IT Risk Reference Model proposed in this contribution reduces the complexity of the 
modeling challenge by defining four layers. It connects the economic view on IT risks with the 
technological one on the basis of vulnerabilities. The IT Risk Reference Model serves as a framework 
modeling the interdependent layers in the form of matrixes and allows a formal description of the 
interdependencies between the separated layers according to a company’s requirements. Realizing the 
full potential of a business process-oriented IT risk management and providing management with 
adequate risk information at any time requires integrating the modeled relations into all phases of the 
risk management process. This is still an open and wide field to research and the formal IT Risk 
Reference Model can be seen as a first step towards improving the accuracy of risk quantification and 
thus the whole of risk management.
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